Iowa Ag Review, Fall 2001, Vol. 7, no. 4 by unknown
Iowa Ag Review
Fall 2001, Vol. 7 No. 4
Trade, Wealth Creation, and American Agriculture
Bruce A. Babcock
babcock@iastate.edu
515-294-6785
Why do we trade? MostAmericans would answerthis question with some
reference to the benefits of ex-
panded markets for U.S. goods and
more job opportunities. However, if
asked the question, why do we
work? most would respond that we
work to earn money so that we can
buy things. At a personal level, we
intuitively know that trading our spe-
cialized labor with others (using
money as the means of transactions)
gives us a higher standard of living
than if we tried to produce every-
thing ourselves. We know and act on
the knowledge that specialization
enhances our individual wealth. But
economists have known for more
than 200 years that what holds at the
individual level also holds nation-
ally. A country will have more
wealth and a higher standard of liv-
ing if the country specializes in pro-
ducing those products that it is
relatively good at producing, export-
ing the surplus, and using the pro-
ceeds to buy imported products.
The notion that the gains from
foreign trade should be measured
by what we import, not by what we
export, is difficult for many to ac-
cept. Clearly, the statements of
some of our leaders in Washington
suggest that they see the benefits of
trade in terms of our ability to in-
crease exports, not in terms of our
ability to increase our imports. For
example, Secretary of Agriculture
Veneman frequently argues that she
wants to open up overseas export
markets for the benefit of U.S. farm-
ers. And it is a common bipartisan
belief in Congress that increased
imports are actually bad for the
United States. AgWeb.com (“Inside
Washington Today,” October 1) re-
ported that Senator Lott (R-Miss.)
held up the legislation that granted
normal trade relations status to
Vietnam because of his concerns
that the Vietnamese catfish industry
threatens U.S. catfish farmers. And
Senator Baucus (D-Mont.) has led
efforts to limit Canadian softwood
lumber because such imports hurt
American lumber mills.
As major exporters, Iowa and
other Corn Belt states have a keen
interest in the direction of U.S. trade
policy. Will the United States follow its
free trade rhetoric and pursue global
free trade agreements that expand
trade? Or will concern about the im-
pacts of imports limit expansion of
trade? While nobody can say with cer-
tainty whether the United States will
become more or less protectionist, a
closer examination of the issues will
help clarify the issues so that a more
informed debate can take place.
IMPORTANCE OF EXPORTS TO
CORN BELT AGRICULTURE
The United States has exported an
average of 20 percent of its corn pro-
duction and 45 percent of its soy-
bean production over the last five
years. We exported additional
amounts of corn and soybeans as
meat. Changes in the demand for U.S
corn, soybeans, pork, beef, and poul-
try by overseas consumers have a
direct impact on the prices Iowa
farmers receive for their production.
This direct link is why many look to
the expansion of feed and meat ex-
ports as the only way to achieve sus-
tained strength in market prices.
Most U.S. farm leaders rail
against markets closed to U.S. ex-
ports. But how easy is it for foreign
countries to open up their markets? A
look at our own political debates
about protectionist policies will
show why such openings are difficult
to achieve.
THE POLITICS OF TRADE POLICY
If all our political leaders were well
trained in economics, then they
would accept the fact that we export
goods to earn foreign exchange so
that we can purchase imported items.
If, in addition to being good econo-
mists, they did not care if they were re-
elected, then they would adopt the
trade policy that would create the
most wealth for U.S. residents. That
policy would be for us to unilaterally
take down all of our trade barriers.
This action would lower import
prices, raise our standard of living,
and increase the level of domestic
competition. This increased competi-
tion would help to keep consumer
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prices low in the future and would
lead to increased productivity as com-
panies invest to stay ahead of domes-
tic and international competition.
If unilateral trade liberalization
would be so good for us, why haven’t
we adopted it? The answer is simple.
Enhancing national wealth is not the
goal of trade policy. Policy results
from the natural desire of our political
leaders to respond to the interests of
their constituents. And whose inter-
ests are most likely to be brought to
the attention of our leaders? The inter-
ests of those groups for which policy
benefits are large enough to justify the
hiring of a lobbyist.
In Montana, owners of wheat-
producing land and timberland have
an interest in limiting wheat and
lumber imports from Canada. Steel
manufacturers and labor unions
that represent steelworkers in Penn-
sylvania and Ohio have an interest
in limiting steel imports from South
Korea and the European Union (EU)
to maintain steel profits and steel
jobs. Sugar producers in North Da-
kota, Minnesota, and Florida want
continued restrictions on sugar im-
ports to maintain their artificially
high sugar profits. Clearly, it makes
economic sense for all these groups
to fund lobbying efforts to convince
Congress and the Administration to
adopt protectionist policies. And
these same forces are at work in ev-
ery country where competition
from U.S. exports threatens their
own vested interests.
To see why anti-import forces
often win policy debates, consider
the U.S. sugar program. A recent re-
port by the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) estimated that U.S.
consumers would gain between
$770 million and $1.96 billion per
year if we completely opened our
market to foreign sugar. This is a
substantial amount of money, but it
amounts to only $2.70 to $7.25 per
U.S. resident per year. The GAO re-
port indicated that each U.S. sugar
producer would lose an average of
about $125,000 a year, with many
growers losing in excess of $1 mil-
lion if sugar imports were liberal-
ized. In this case, the small gains to
the many would seem to outweigh
the losses to the few if we opened
our market to imported sugar. Never-
theless, this economic imbalance
does not usually translate into adop-
tion of a free trade policy because
Congress simply does not hear from
outraged sugar consumers. It only
hears from outraged sugar farmers.
The political balance of power in
trade policy favors those who advo-
cate for protectionism. The benefits
of protection fall to the few who can
organize and lobby for it, whereas
the costs of protectionism are borne
by the many (all of us) who do not
find it worthwhile to spend time and
money in support of free trade.
WHAT ABOUT UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES?
Of course, companies and indus-
tries that lobby for protectionist
policies do not couch their argu-
ments in terms of their desire for
higher profits. Rather, they typi-
cally argue their case by citing “un-
fair” competition from foreign
exporters. Often the “unfairness” is
caused by lower labor costs in the
exporting countries. But unfair
practices can also include govern-
ment subsidies to the exporting in-
dustries, direct subsidies to
exports, and preferential tax treat-
ments. Without some protection,
lobbyists argue, companies and in-
dustries would be go out of busi-
ness, and U.S. consumers would be
forced to buy from foreign suppli-
ers. What should be the response
to these arguments?
One response is to simply say,
so what? If a company in a foreign
country chooses to supply us with a
product at a price lower than we
ourselves can make it, then we had
better take advantage of the offer. If
an exporting country’s taxpayers
want to subsidize our consumption,
then who is taking advantage of
whom?
Few countries, with the notable
exceptions of Hong Kong, Singapore,
and New Zealand, have adopted this
“so what” response. This is not sur-
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prising given that profits for domes-
tic companies are at risk, and those
at-risk profits can be used to lobby
for relief. Besides, if domestic com-
panies or industries go out of busi-
ness because of import competition
helped by excessive government
subsidies, they may have a legiti-
mate complaint.
Where can harmed industries
get relief? From the federal govern-
ment? There is a problem with al-
lowing the domestic government to
adjudicate a trade complaint. Past
experience suggests that this re-
sults in too much relief and too few
imports. (See “Coming Home to
Roost: Proliferating Antidumping
Laws and the Growing Threat to U.S.
Exports,” by Brink Lindsey and Dan
Ikenson, Center for Trade Policy
Studies, July 30, 2001.)
The alternative response is to
let a more disinterested third party
adjudicate trade complaints, be-
yond domestic boundaries. That
third party is the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO).
ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
The WTO was formed upon comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations in 1994. Its primary
purpose is to review trade policies
and to settle trade disputes between
member countries. The WTO has no
ability to enforce its findings, so it
can settle disputes only if member
countries choose to adhere to WTO
rulings. So far, the track record of
adherence is mixed. The EU was
found to be out of compliance when
it banned U.S. beef imports pro-
duced with growth hormones. But
the ban continues. The WTO has
ruled twice against the United
States for use of the foreign sales
corporation tax, which could lead to
$4 billion worth of sanctions if the
dispute continues.
If the WTO finds that a country
is out of compliance, then trade
partners are allowed to use sanc-
tions in the form of import tariffs
against the offending country’s ex-
ports. As a result, the U.S. has raised
the cost of certain European exports
by $116 million in response to the
EU ban on hormone beef, subse-
quently increasing the cost of these
items for U.S. consumers. It might
seem odd that a country punishes
another country by taxing its own
citizens with import tariffs, but that
is the only remedy offered.
For the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism to work, countries must
voluntarily give up some of their
economic sovereignty and follow
WTO rulings. The benefits to the
world trading system from reduced
national sovereignty are obvious:
trade volume and value will expand,
accelerating world wealth creation.
Giving up some economic sover-
eignty is good for each individual
country as well, because WTO rul-
ings can be an effective counter-
weight against lobbyists for
domestic industries that seek pro-
tectionist policies. Thus, for ex-
ample, if Canada brings a WTO
complaint against United States soft-
wood lumber tariffs and wins, then
U.S. politicians that have supported
the tariffs can say that they have
done all they can do, and U.S. citi-
zens can enjoy the benefits of less
expensive wood.
FUTURE TRADE POLICY AND
AGRICULTURE
The best hope for expanded exports
of U.S. corn, soybeans, and meat
products lies with the WTO. The
fourth biannual WTO trade minis-
ters’ conference is scheduled to meet
in Doha, Qatar, on November 9. (The
last conference was held in Seattle in
1999.) At the top of the agenda is an
agreement to start a new round of
trade liberalization talks. Trade in
agricultural products likely will be a
large part of a new round. However,
developing-country members are
protesting that they did not receive
enough of the benefits from the last
round of talks. They argue that they
still face unfair competition from EU
export subsidies, import tariffs, and
producer subsidies. They dislike U.S.
production subsidies and import re-
strictions on textiles and certain ag-
ricultural products such as peanuts
and sugar. Developing countries will
need to be convinced that they will
have more time to implement the
last agreement, and that any new
agreement will open up developed-
country markets to their goods.
If the United States and the Euro-
pean Union are serious about want-
ing to increase world trade, then a
demonstration of good faith would
go a long way toward showing that a
new round of trade negotiations will
actually benefit the developing
countries. Such a demonstration
could be a speedup in the timetable
by which textile trade is liberalized.
Of course, U.S. cotton farmers would
line up to fight this liberalization. Or,
the European Union could further
lower its wheat support price and
wheat export subsidies. Of course,
French wheat farmers would likely
drive their tractors to Paris in pro-
test. Or, the United States could re-
place all non-recourse loans with
recourse loans, which would elimi-
nate the government-provided in-
centive to keep producing corn,
soybeans, cotton, and wheat when
the market is signaling farmers to
cut production. We all know what
the reaction to this proposal would
be. Nevertheless, developing coun-
tries are looking for such a demon-
stration. If we want to move forward
with further trade liberalization,
then the United States and the Euro-
pean Union may have to sacrifice a
few sacred cows currently protected
from import competition.u
If an exporting country’s
taxpayers want to subsi-
dize our consumption,
then who is taking
advantage of whom?
4        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT         FALL 2001
Iowa Ag Review
GianCarlo Moschini
moschini@iastate.edu
515-294-5761
The recent European Union(EU) draft legislation on label-ing and tracing all food and
feed consisting of, containing, or
produced from genetically modified
(GM) organisms has the potential to
significantly affect long-run U.S. agri-
cultural exports to Europe. For the
last three years, a de facto morato-
rium has halted approval of new GM
varieties in the EU. Whereas the pro-
posed new EU legislation may help
resolve this impasse, the details of
this draft legislation are raising con-
siderable concern in the U.S. agricul-
tural community and, if approved,
are likely to give rise to a serious
trade dispute within the World Trade
Organization.
It seems that this EU proposal
marks an increase in the interna-
tional divergence in the way new bio-
technology products are being
regulated. Some have suggested that
differing GM product regulations in
the United States and in the EU can
be traced back to the EU reliance on
the “precautionary principle.”
Whereas the EU has embraced such
a concept as the guiding principle in
developing its new regulations on
GM food, the United States has re-
sisted explicitly recognizing it.
BACKGROUND
The principle of precautionary action
is rooted in German environmental
law and was first applied internation-
ally at a 1987 London conference
dealing with the protection of the
North Sea. This concept was adopted
in the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Develop-
ment, where it was succinctly
described in one of the principles of
the Rio Declaration: “Lack of full sci-
entific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective
Who is Afraid of the “Precautionary Principle”?
measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” The Biosafety Protocol
agreed to in Montreal in 2000, the
first international agreement with
provisions aimed at regulating trade
of GM products, also explicitly ap-
peals to the precautionary principle.
These applications of the precau-
tionary approach dealt with environ-
mental risks, but the EU Commission
made a substantial extension of its
scope last year by adopting it to deal
more generally with risk to “ …the
environment, human, animal and
plant health,” effectively expanding
the use of this principle to include
food safety.
The extension of the precaution-
ary principle to deal with food
safety, and in particular its use to
regulate GM food, has been very
controversial. Some have charged
that the principle is unscientific.
Others have argued that it is a logi-
cal fallacy to rely on this principle
to establish the safety of new prod-
ucts because it amounts to impos-
ing an impossible burden of proof.
This conclusion is based on inter-
preting the precautionary principle
to mean that a new product or a
new technology should not be ap-
proved as long as there is the possi-
bility of some harm being done, that
is, effectively demanding a conclu-
sive proof of zero risk. But this ren-
dition of the precautionary
principle is untenable.
RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK
How should we deal with the risks
that inevitably are associated with a
new technology?  Suppose we need
to decide between allowing a new
GM variety and not allowing it.
When the choice involves genuine
uncertainty (something is not
known for sure), decision theory, as
developed by economists and statis-
ticians, emphasizes the crucial as-
pects of trading off benefits and
costs across possible “states of the
world.” If for all possible contingen-
cies the new variety gives only posi-
tive outcomes, then the choice is
obvious. But typically that is not the
case, and we must trade off net posi-
tive benefits that accrue when ev-
erything turns out smoothly with
the net costs that accrue when a
negative outcome actually material-
izes. This trade-off requires that we
know the size of net benefits or
costs in each possible state of the
world and the probability of that
contingency to arise (so that, for
example, a catastrophic outcome
that is believed possible only with a
very small probability can still have
a substantial impact on choice).
Furthermore, this trade-off depends
on the risk tolerance of the
decisionmaker. This much is clear
for individual choices: one person’s
desired portfolio allocation be-
tween stocks and cash is not neces-
sarily optimal for another person.
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The problem is more complex
when we deal with risk trade-offs
not for an individual but for society.
But the essence of the problem is
the same. What is the role of science
in this framework?  Quite clearly,
science has a lot to offer in identify-
ing the various possible outcomes
of an action and the probability that
can be associated with each pos-
sible outcome. But science is not of
much help in deciding what the opti-
mal level of risk exposure should be
(just as an economist cannot tell
you how much of your portfolio to
put in stocks). That is why risk regu-
lation has traditionally distin-
guished between “risk assessment”
and “risk management.” Risk assess-
ment is the technical step, and re-
lies heavily on scientific evidence,
whereas risk management is the
policy stage, where a decision is
made on how much risk can be tol-
erated (conceivably in exchange for
expected net benefits).
Does application of the precau-
tionary principle necessarily lead
to a drastically different way of
dealing with and regulating risk?
No, it does not. The precautionary
principle should be interpreted as a
tool for risk management, the
policy stage of choosing the opti-
mal risk exposure. Its basic tenet is
that, when some uncertainty exists
about the outcomes of an action,
this uncertainty must be factored
into the choice problem. This is ex-
actly what decision theory man-
dates! Viewed in this light, the
precautionary principle is less ob-
jectionable, but it is also not as
novel and is perhaps redundant. In-
deed, even when the precautionary
principle is not invoked explicitly,
regulatory actions aimed at risk
can be construed as being consis-
tent with it. For example, the 1998
U.S. decision to withhold approval
of StarLink maize for human con-
sumption (because of the possibil-
ity, to this day unverified, that its
particular Bt protein could be an
allergen) arguably can be charac-
terized as a textbook application of
the precautionary principle.
THE REAL ISSUES
Differing and incompatible na-
tional regulations for GM food
could prove crippling to the com-
modity-based international trading
system for agricultural products.
Harmonization of such regulations
is imperative if the heralded gains
from biotechnology innovations in
agriculture are to be realized. A
rational and credible process for
dealing with the potential risks of
these new technologies is, of
course, crucial. In this context, an
ideological opposition to the pre-
cautionary principle is misplaced.
Reliance on the precautionary
principle need not bias public
choices against new technologies
when it is seen in the context of
risk management (as opposed to
risk assessment). The unresolved
issue, perhaps, is how to make the
precautionary principle opera-
tional in a transparent way, so that
it can be translated into effective
policy choices that strike an opti-
mal trade-off between benefits and
risks of new technologies.
If the EU policies on GM prod-
ucts are perceived as too cautious,
it may be because either  “exces-
sive” risk aversion is being built
into regulations, or incorrect pre-
sumptions on possible outcomes
and their probabilities are being
used. In the latter case, science
can be of considerable help in dis-
pelling misconceptions, and more
scientific evidence on various im-
plications of GM products is
needed. In the former case, the
question to ask is, why pick on GM
products? If very different risk
standards are being used with re-
spect to GM products (relative to
traditionally bred varieties, for ex-
ample), then this point needs to be
attacked directly, not peripherally.
Regulating risk requires that we
understand what to be afraid of,
and to what degree, but there is no
need to be afraid of the precaution-
ary principle. u
GianCarlo Moschini is professor of
economics and Pioneer Chair in Sci-
ence and Technology Policy.
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The harvest season, accompanied by the humming ofcombines and the bright colors of autumn, now reignsover the midwestern plains. Hot and dry August weather
has somewhat hampered progress and has led to a delayed
harvest, which continues to stay a couple weeks behind
schedule. While foreign demand may be influenced by the
fluctuations in the U.S. dollar and increased shipping costs,
domestic demand may expand because the major bulk of grain
is used as livestock feed, and livestock numbers are on the rise.
On the livestock side, data indicates that the national beef cow
herd remains stable while pork inventories appear to be more
than usually depleted as compared to this time last year, which
may translate into higher livestock prices this fall.
CROPS
Iowa Corn. Overall, it appears that this year’s Iowa corn crop
will be close to the five-year average. Corn ripened faster over
the second half of September, even though corn development
lagged behind at the beginning of the season. According to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Iowa Crops and
Weather reports, by October 14, corn crop matured and was
safe from frost on 98 percent of the total acres. Only 14
percent of the state’s corn acreage was in the bin compared to
73 percent last year and 40 percent on average. The moisture
level of harvested corn was recorded at 20 percent across the
state, which was 4 percent lower than that of corn remaining
in the field. The corn condition is fairly stable, rated at 58
percent good to excellent, a rating lower than that of last
year’s crop. October 1 estimates have Iowa’s corn crop
projected to yield 141 bushels per acre, up 2.2 percent from
the previous estimate. If this forecast is on the mark, the
realized yield will be 4 bushels below last year, for a total of
1.62 billion bushels, down 7 percent from last year. In Septem-
ber, the price of corn in Iowa averaged $1.85 per bushel, up
$0.39 from a year ago.
U.S. Corn. On the national scene, in October the USDA
raised corn yield estimates to 136.3 bushels per acre, up 2.2
percent from the September Crop Production report. This
Projected Corn and Soybean Yields Down
Slightly from Last Year, and Continuing Profits
Expected in Hog Markets
Continued on page 10
Iowa Cash Receipts  Jan. – June
2001 2000 1999
                     (Million Dollars)
Crops 2,163 2,256 2,249
Livestock 2,786 2,947 2,323
Total 4,949 5,203 4,572
World Stocks-to-Use Ratios
     Crop Year
        2001/02       2000/01 1999/00
                     (Sept. Projection)        (Estimate)         (Actual)
            (Percent)
Corn 19.23 25.83 28.25
Soybeans 14.72 16.65 16.78
Wheat 22.60 26.92 28.34
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Received by Iowa Farmers
 Aug*             July
            2001          2001     2000
                              ($/Bushel)
Corn 1.83 1.79 1.43
Soybeans 4.87 4.77 4.32
Oats 1.35 1.29 0.93
                                    ($/Ton)
Alfalfa 86.00 90.00 77.00
All Hay 85.00 89.00 76.00
                                    ($/Cwt.)
Steers & Heifers 71.30 72.10 67.70
Feeder Calves 102.00 103.00 105.00
Cows 44.90 44.70 40.70
Barrows & Gilts 53.60 53.40 46.90
Sows 43.80 43.60 37.90
Sheep 37.40 31.00
Lambs 60.10 85.10
           ($/Dozen)
Eggs 0.27 0.22 0.40
             ($/Cwt.)
All Milk 16.20 15.90 11.90
*Mid-month
        Aug
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
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U.S. agricultural subsidies are easy to
criticize because they are far from uni-
formly distributed. Subsidies are concen-
trated geographically, they are
concentrated on relatively few crops,
and they are concentrated on relatively
few producers. The accompanying three
charts illustrate these three dimensions
of concentration.
Figure 1 shows the concentration of subsidies across U.S. agricultural products.
Crops and livestock products were ranked according to their share of subsidy rela-
tive to their share of value in 1999. According to this measure, rice is the most heavily
subsidized crop, receiving 5 percent of U.S. subsidies but contributing only 0.7 per-
cent of the value of U.S. agricultural production. Cotton is next, with a 13 percent
share of subsidies and a 2 percent share of value. Corn is the tenth most subsidized
commodity, with a 27 percent subsidy share and a 10 percent value share. In 1999,
soybeans received relatively low subsidies, with a 10 percent subsidy share and a 7
percent share of value. The reason for this low ranking is that soybeans did not qualify
for Agricultural Market Transition Assistance (AMTA) payments. In the next farm
bill, soybean supporters want soybeans to be treated as a full-fledged program crop
with all the resulting subsidies.
Most of U.S. agriculture receives little or no subsidies, with 60 percent of the value
of U.S. agricultural production receiving a 3 percent subsidy share in 1999. This con-
centration of benefits on a relatively few commodities is an artifact of the way that
commodity programs were initially set up in the 1930s. Tobacco, barley, corn, wheat,
cotton, oats, rice, and grain sorghum were by far the most important commodity crops
that had firm political backing because production was geographically concentrated
in a relatively small number of states. Livestock production was much more widely
distributed throughout the states, and a significant portion of livestock products were
consumed on-farm or locally. Soybeans was a relatively minor crop. Because today’s
farm programs are still based largely on the reality of agriculture from 50 to 60 years
ago, we see the con-
centration patterns
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows
that concentrating
subsidies on crops
also results in a
geographic concen-
tration of subsidies.
The ratio of subsi-
dies to value is
highest in the
states that grow pri-
marily program
crops and that have
relatively small live-
stock sectors. This
The
Concentration
of U.S.
Agricultural
Subsidies
FIGURE 1. CONCENTRATION OF U.S. AG SUBSIDIES IN 1999
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includes Illinois, North
Dakota, and Montana.
Although Iowa grows
mostly corn and soy-
beans, as Illinois does,
it is a large producer of
cattle, hogs, dairy, and
eggs. Note that no state
outside of the Central
United States receives
subsidies that total
more than 10 percent of
the value of production.
This geographic con-
centration of subsidies
largely explains the po-
litical longevity of farm
programs. Corn Belt
legislators work with Cotton Belt and Wheat Belt legislators for mutual gain.
Figure 3 captures the dimension of concentration that draws the most focus of
farm program critics. This is the concentration of payments to eligible producers. In
Iowa, 10 percent of producers who received subsidies from 1996 to 1998 received 45
percent of the subsidies. In Texas over the same period, the top 10 percent of produc-
ers received 65 percent of the payments. Iowa’s relative egalitarianism results from
the fact that nearly all producers in Iowa received some subsidies.
The reason for this high concentration is that the total amount of subsidies re-
ceived on a farm depends on the total amount of program crops produced on that
farm. Only if all farms were of equal size and all land were equally productive across
Iowa would payments be equal. But we know that there is a mixture of large and small
farms in Iowa, and some of the largest farms contain some of the most productive
soils. Combining this heterogeneity with program rules that do not limit the amount
of subsidy an individual farmer can receive results in the type of subsidy concentra-
tion shown in Figure 3.
Critics often charge that farm programs are really all about transferring income
from taxpayers to wealthy farmers. U.S. Department of Agriculture data confirm that
large commercial farms
typically have net incomes
higher than those of aver-
age U.S. households. The
Figure 3 data show that the
largest commercial Iowa
farms do, in fact, receive
the most subsidies. u
FIGURE 2. RATIO OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO VALUE
OF PRODUCTION IN 1999
FIGURE 3. CONCENTRATION OF PAYMENTS TO IOWA
PRODUCERS FROM 1996 TO 1998
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yield would be the third highest on
record. These numbers came as a
surprise because the September
estimates were lower than those in
August. Historically, a low Septem-
ber projection has indicated a lower-
than-expected national corn yield,
which suggests a stronger harvest-
time price outlook. However, the
release of unexpectedly high Octo-
ber crop forecasts, combined with
waning export demand, depressed
corn prices. According to the USDA’s
October Grain Stocks report, total
old crop corn stocks amounted to
1.9 billion bushels on September 1,
which is 11 percent higher than last
year and a record high since Sep-
tember 1993. The split between on-
farm and off-farm storage was 40 to
60 percent, with on-farm stored
stocks 5 percent lower and off-farm
stocks 24 percent higher than last
year. The summertime corn usage
slightly topped that of last year at
2.03 billion bushels compared to
1.87 billion bushels consumed from
June to August in 2000.
Iowa Soybeans. Even though late-
planted soybeans benefited from a
rainy late August, the state’s soybean
harvesting slowed down again due to
a wet second week of October, and it
is slipping behind the average pace.
Soybean harvest progressed to 56
percent complete, compared to 89
percent last year and 79 percent typi-
cally by this time. Statewide, the soy-
bean crop condition remained very
steady at 52 percent good to excellent,
which is comparable to a year ago.
The October 1 yield forecast in-
creased by 1 bushel from the Septem-
ber 1 forecast and reached 43 bushels
per acre, which is 0.5 bushel per acre
lower than at this time last year. A soy-
bean crop of 470.9 million bushels is
expected, which exceeds last year’s
total by 1 percent. Iowa farmers have
received an average of $4.65 per
bushel in September, $0.12 higher
than last year.
U.S. Soybeans. According to the
October 12 USDA Crop Production re-
port, the U.S. production of soybeans
is expected to achieve a record high
of 2.91 billion bushels, up 3 percent
from September 1 projections and up
5 percent from last year’s levels. Na-
tionwide, the soybean yield forecast
has increased to 39.2 bushels per
acre, up 1 bushel from last month’s
estimates and up 1.1 bushel from
2000 yields. On the other hand, the
national stock of soybeans on Sep-
tember 28 was pegged at 248 million
bushels, which is 15 percent lower
than last year. Only about 34 percent
of that was kept on farm, down 26
percent from a year ago. Off-farm
storage accounted for the rest of the
stock and was 7 percent lower than
in 2000. On the demand side, soybean
export prospects were reduced by 10
million bushels in October due to sig-
nificantly larger supplies in South
America. Also, the June-August con-
sumption of 460 million bushels of
soybeans was 5 percent below last
year’s number.
Iowa Hogs and Pigs. The USDA
September Hogs and Pigs report
brought good news for pork produc-
ers, as the numbers were slightly
lower than expected. The September
inventory of all hogs and pigs on U.S.
farms was 1 percent smaller than it
was in September 2000. Also, the
breeding herd and market hogs inven-
tory were both down 1 percent com-
pared to a year ago. Seasonally large
slaughter supplies and heavier
weights depressed hog prices in late
August through September. But the
revised downward inventory esti-
mates suggest that the market floor
may not be as low this fall as origi-
nally expected. Generally, Iowa’s in-
ventory estimates were adjusted
relatively higher compared to the na-
tional average. While the March-June
Iowa pig crop was considerably below
the national level, Iowa farrowing in-
tentions appear to be above the
country’s average for fall and winter.
The USDA estimates 14.7 million hogs
and pigs on Iowa farms as of Septem-
ber 1, down 4 percent from a year ago
and down 100,000 from June 1. The
June-August pig crop totaled 3.655
million, down 12 percent from the
same quarter last year. A total of
430,000 sows were farrowed to pro-
duce these pigs, with an average of 8.5
pigs per litter. Producers’ intentions
were to farrow 450,000 sows and gilts
during the September-November
quarter, down 6 percent from last year.
The planned farrowings for Decem-
ber-February are recorded at 460,000
sows and gilts, which is 4 percent
lower than for the same period in
2000. The inventories and production
intentions in the September report
seem to suggest that barrow and gilt
prices may remain at profitable lev-
els well into the summer of 2002. u
Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
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Behind all good policy analysisis good economic theory,backed by mathematical pro-
gramming models that often use
massive data and crunch massive
numbers. And behind all good pro-
gramming and data systems is a
good computer system, backed by
professionals who know how to
keep things humming. Michael
Long belongs to this club of com-
puter professionals at CARD; he’s
been working to maintain CARD’s
computers, servers, and networks
since 1990.
A systems analyst in Computer
Services, Mike can usually be found
troubleshooting or installing soft-
ware at one of the 50-plus personal
computers in use on any given day.
The pace of technological advances
in the computer sector keeps hard-
ware and software upgrades on the
docket almost constantly. Mike says
he and other computer support staff
work to keep equipment operating
efficiently. “We try to make any
changes in computing here at CARD
in a gradual, orderly fashion with as
few disruptions as possible.”
Viruses and security are often
on his mind, as he sifts through
newsletters and e-mail alerts to get a
jump on any potential threats. The
Economics Department computer
server recently succumbed to the
latest menace—the Nimda virus,
which meant hours of damage con-
trol by the department’s systems
staff. But CARD’s computers and
servers have sidestepped that par-
ticular threat, for now. The guard-
ians of the data, including Mike,
work relentlessly to protect CARD’s
investment.
Mike says he likes the challenge
of finding solutions to technical prob-
lems. And, as in most computer-
driven agencies, technical problems
are not hard to come by. The variety
of work is also a plus, he says. So,
too, are the people. “CARD is a very
nice place to work,” he says. “It is a
good opportunity to be able to work
with very gifted and caring faculty,
staff, and graduate students.”
A true technophile, Mike spends
his spare time tinkering. “I like to
repair broken things, working on au-
tos and doing home improvements,”
he says. “Putting in water lines for
our rural water service is my next
big project.”
Mike and his wife, Anne, have
three children: Candice, Chucky, and
Melanie. At home he’s been busy
helping Melanie, his youngest, work
through pre-school materials to pre-
pare for kindergarten next year, and
he will soon install some fencing so
that Candice, his oldest daughter,
can have a horse and some sheep.u
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